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An important part of China's comprehensive reform programme in the last 
ten years has been the reform of the economic, institutional and legal 
framework of foreign economic relations and trade. ))The Open Door 
Policycc is the second part of the overall slogan of the current period of 
Chinese history, calling for ))Economic Reform and Opening to the Out- 
side World,cc and is an integral part of China's new development strategy. 
Reform 
One of the most radical and outstanding parts of this reform have been the 
cutting up of the nation into different regions with different economic pos- 
sibilities and conditions. Since the establishment of the first Special Eco- 
nomic Zone (SEZ) in 1980 until the formulation of the ((Costal Region 
Strategycc in 1987 the granting of special privileges concerning economic 
relations to the outside world have gradually expanded to include a very 
great part of China's industrialized regions, involving an area of 325.000 
km2 and a population of 200 mio. people. Another outstanding feature of 
this reform is the fact that foreigners with the promulgation of the ))Law on 
Chinese- Foreign Joint Venturesc in July 1979 for the first time since 1949 
have been allowed to invest money in the Chinese development. These 
two phenomena have won world-wide attention and caused analysis and 
debate among Western scholars. Not less important, however, is the sys- 
tematic reform of the more regular trade activities and the introduction of 
a whole range of new possibilities for economic cooperation between 
Chinese enterprises and foreign partners. 
This article focuses primarily on the problems connected with this last 
part of the reform, i.e, the regional and sectoral decentralization of deci- 
sion-making at the nation-wide level, because the situation in the 
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southern and coastal parts of China is judged to be well described and ana- 
lyzed in existing literature. 
Decentralization 
The reform of the trade activities follows the general reform policy of the 
Chinese government in recent years, perhaps in a more cautious way, ,with 
the main focus on transfer of decision-making power to lower levels with 
the aim to make production enterprises economically self-regulating, and 
on the handling of the interplay between the individual, the organizations 
and the state through the signing of contracts. The state gets its share from 
taxation rather than from transfer of profit followed by central allocation of 
resources. 
Decentralization of economic decision-making in foreign trade proce- 
dures has been a gradual process since 1979. Prior to 1978 all foreign trade 
was conducted through about 10 centralized Foreign Trade Corporations 
(FTCs) under the aegis of the Ministry of Foreign Trade. Even now most 
trade is carried out through specialized FTCs, but by a much larger num- 
ber of them. Following the introduction of reform, ministries and provin- 
ces were allowed to set up FTCs outside the realm of central control. The 
exact number of these corporations is unknown, but figures up to 5000 
have been mentioned. Only Sino-Foreign Joint Ventures (JVs) and a few big 
Chinese enterprises have been granted direct trading rights. 
In 1979 new institutions were created to regulate the new activities and 
the whole top level was reorganized in 1982, when the Ministry of Foreign 
Economic Relations and Trade(M0FERT) was established by the merging 
of the Ministry of Foreign Trade with the Import Export Commission, the 
Commission of Economic Relations and the Foreign Investment Commis- 
sion, bringing the jurisdiction of foreign trade and foreign investment un- 
der the same ministry. In 1984 this Ministry issued a decision identifying 
the most important parts of reform of the foreign trade system as follows: 
1) To separate government and enterprise management (zheng qi fenkai), 
which implies that the corporations and enterprises should be responsible 
for their own profits and losses (zifu yingkui). The Ministry is to regulate 
foreign trade only by administrative and economic measures. 2) To unify 
production and trade by allowing some enterprises to trade directly with 
foreign countries (gongmao gongsi, nongmao gongsi, jimao gongsi are the 
names for enterprises integrating industry with trade, agriculture with 
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trade and technology with trade). 3) To introduce an agent system (dailizhi) 
for import and export.' 
The method to make the foreign trade enterprises responsible for own 
profits and losses is to introduce the contract responsibility system (cheng- 
bao zeren zhidu). This system was tried out in 1987 in three selected indus- 
tries: light industry, arts and crafts industry, and the garment industry, 
where the enterprises sign contracts with the FTCs who again sign con- 
tracts with central authorities. In the beginning of 1988 the State Council 
decided to extend the use of this system to the whole foreign trade sector. 
Responsibilities, rights and privileges are allocated between the state and 
local authorities, between local authorities and foreign trade enterprises 
and between foreign trade enterprises and enterprise workers via three 
separate norms: a target for income from export, a target for income of for- 
eign exchange to be delivered to the state, and a target for total profit. At- 
I 
tainment of the target is linked to reward at every level. Above-target profit 
of foreign exchange is divided between the state and the lower level at a ra- 
I tio of 2:8, i.e 20% to the state and 80% to the locality or enterprise. This ratio 
is mentioned as some kind of standard2, it can ostensibly vary from one 
region or sector to another. At the corporation level I have heard figures of 
55%, 70°/o, and 20% retained, but the criteria for determining the figure is 
not clear. It is stated to be ((according to circumstances.cc 
The granting of the right to trade directly with foreign countries have un- 
til now been reserved for very big enterprises, mostly at the provincial 
level. 
The introduction of the agent system - the last of the three aims men- 
tioned in 1984 - is still only proceeding very slowly. For instance in August 
1989 in the city of Harbin five of the biggest FTCs had either not instituted 
it at all or only on a very limited scale. 
Along with the decentralization scheme a host of opportunities has been 
opened for new forms of trading in the form of compensation trade 
(buchang maoyi), processing agreements (lailiao jiagong) and assembling 
contracts (laijian zhuangbei). These forms blur the distinction between 
trade and investment, their main characteristic - roughly speaking -being 
that a foreign partner supplies the Chinese with equipment andlor 
material and is paid with products from this equipment or from another 
production. These forms are regulated by contracts approved by local 
authorities, and are covered by general laws concerning taxation, import 
duties, licensing etc. 
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Foreign Investment 
Direct foreign investment takes the form of equity joint ventures (shewai 
hezi jingying qiye), contractual joint ventures (hezuo jingying qiye) and 
cooperative development of natural resources (hezuo kaifa), particularly 
off-shore oil, An equity joint venture is to be a limited liability company 
with at least 25% foreign capital, and the chairman of the board is to be a 
citizen of China. A cooperative venture is a much looser form. It does not 
have to constitute a legal person, but can be any contracted agreement on 
a certain kind of production. A last category is wholly foreign owned ven- 
tures where a foreign company is allowed by law to establish an enterprise 
on Chinese territory without any Chinese capital involved. This is almost 
exclusively permitted in the SEZs. Development of natural resources is co- 
vered by a special law-complex, which shall not be further elaborated here. 
Experiments with absorption of foreign capital are most radically tried 
out in the coastal area. At the moment there exist five regular SEZs (jingji 
tequ), situated in the southern part of the coastal region: Shenzhen, Zhu- 
hai, Shantou, Xiamen and Hainan Island. The first four were established 
in 1980, Hainan was made a province as well as a SEZ in April 1988, The 
zones are physically demarcated areas in traditional farming land. Guang- 
dong and Fujian provinces, where they are situated, are empowered to for- 
mulate development plans, to approve investment projects, handle land 
allotment, provide staff and workers, and establish cultural and health fa- 
cilities. On the other hand, they are also obliged to provide public utilities 
as water supply, drainage, power, roads, wharves, communications and 
warehouses. Thus the SEZs are essentially provincial undertakings, 
although governed by general regulations approved by the National Peo- 
ple's Congress. According to these regulations raw material, equipment 
and so on imported by investors into the zones are exempted from duties, 
and products for export are exempted from taxes, while products for 
domestic sale shall be taxed. The income tax rate of enterprises is half the 
tax on the mainland, that is 15% of taxable income, and profits remitted 
abroad are not taxed. The zones have, moreover, been allowed to transfer 
land-use rights for ))compensation,(( i.e. to sell the right to use a certain 
piece of land for a fixed period of time (mostly 50 years) to foreign inves- 
tors, The price is negotiable below a fixed limit. This right has until now 
been reserved for the SEZs and the largest cities, but recently a state official 
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disclosed that some big and medium cities, including several inland ones, 
are expected to obtain this right later in 1989.3 
In November 1984 the possibilities of preferential treatment of foreign in- 
vestors were broadened to include the socalled economic and technologi- 
cal development zones oingji jishu kaifa qu) in 14 port cities along the east 
coast. In April that year the State Council made a decision to open these 
cities (under the name of yanhai kaifang chengshi) which, in contrast to the 
previously established zones, are industrially and commercially deve- 
loped. As a concrete manifestation of the decision the authorities were to 
establish demarcated zones within their areas, where tax and duty conces- 
sions similar, or almost similar, to the SEZs, were given. Again it is the 
provincial (or the city in case of a plan-independent city) authorities who 
are to invest in infrastructure, energy supply, drainage, etc. possibly in 
cooperation with foreign investors. The same authorities are given the 
possibility of giving preferential treatment to enterprises with foreign capi- 
tal in the old urban areas of the cities. The provincial People's Govern- 
ments propose measures to attract foreign investment to the State Council 
for approval. 
In June 1988 the latest expansion came as the Ministry of Finance issued 
temporary provisions giving possibilities for tax reductions for foreign en- 
terprises in the whole of the Liaodong and Shandong peninsulaes, in the 
Zhangjiang and Zhujiang deltaes and in coastal municipalities in Fujian 
province. The provisions name the areas together as coastal open eco- 
nomic areas (yanhai jingji kaifang qu). This last measure is a consequence of 
a more comprehensive plan for development of the Chinese economy by 
opening to the outside world, known as the ))coastal region strategycc (yan- 
hai diqu jingji fazhan zhanliie) promulgated by Zhao Ziyang in 1987. The 
coastal region strategy argues for a very uneven economic development of 
the whole country by concentrating resources on further development of 
the whole of the east coast, making it one huge special economic region 
with very favorable conditions for foreign investors. This strategy is 
presented as a national rather than a regional policy where the opening of 
the coast area is to be used as the engine for development pushing national 
reform forward. Some economists and politicians see this strategy as the 
beginning of a whole new phase in reform of the foreign economic rela- 
tions and trade ~ y s t e m . ~  
This strategy advocates using China's cheap high-quality skilled wor- 
kers and technical personnel in large and mediumsized urban industrial 
Hatla Thelle 
enterprises to develop an internationally competitive industry producing 
technology- intensive goods. The objective is not, as could be assumed, to 
absorb the large rural surplus labour force into labour- intensive industries 
producing light industrial goods for e ~ p o r t . ~  These new industries shall 
use Chinese transnational corporations (kuaguo jituangongsi) as their main 
operational entities to go out and ))conquer the world market.d These 
transnational corporations shall develop from already existing large in- 
dustrial enterprises, trade enterprises or financial enterprises and they 
shall have a great deal of functional diversity. Production, trade, technol- 
ogy transfer, financial operations, and overseas investment shall be 
, 
managed by one company. 
Overseas investment by Chinese investors is already an integral part of 
China's opening to the outside world. In March 1989 the State Council for 
the first time promulgated a set of rules for management of overseas invest- 
ment stipulating, among other things, that each investor should pay a 
guarantee - 5% of the investment in foreign exchange - to ensure the timely 
repatriation of the firm's profit. Up to now Chinese investors have estab- 
lished more than 500 joint ventures and other cooperative undertakings in 
70 different countries, with the total contract value exceeding 2 billion US 
dollars. However, there have been some problems getting the profit back 
to China as required, some firms have used the money for other purposes, 
and the new rules are an attempt to prevent this diversion. 
Problems 
Reasons for reform 
The arguments behind the decentralization of the foreign trade system fol- 
low the arguments for the general reform of industrial management, i.e. 
bureaucracy and central control strangled enthusiasm and vitality in the 
enterprises and made them economically ineffective. To solve these 
problems experiments were made directed at separating ownership rights 
(or government rights) from management rights and concentrate power, 
responsibility, and benefit (quan, ze, li) at the enterprise level, and this 
seems still to be the ultimate objective of the reform. The contract responsi- 
bility system was chosen as the way to bring about this functional separa- 
tion, and by 1987,80% of all state- owned enterprises were carrying out the 
responsibility system, As mentioned above this system were not 
thoroughly implemented in the foreign trade sector before 1988. 
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Apart from that, the foreign trade system had the special problem of 
bridging the gap between China's producers and the world market. The 
overly centralized structure of the old system created an ))air-lock(( between 
the two parties, where the FTCs were the main point of contact between 
China and the world market. That meant that Chinese enterprise 
managers had only limited contact with foreign buyers and suppliers and 
had no knowledge of (or interest in) the price level at the international mar- 
ket. They sold their products to the FTCs, who then shouldered the 
responsibility of getting rid of them again. To strengthen the contact be- 
tween seller and buyer the agent system was introduced and the monop- 
oly of the ministerial FTCs was discarded. The agent system gives a much 
closer contact to the end-user, and the producer derives a direct benefit 
from high quality, timely delivery good packing, etc. of his product. The 
FTC acts as a go-between to assist the manufacturer in negotiating and 
signing contracts and handle the necessary commercial formalities. 
Whether the negotiated prices and other conditions are acceptable is the 
decision and responsibility of the production units themselves. The end of 
the monopoly means, that the enterprise manager can select another, 
agent, if he is dissatisfied with the service offered, and he can then maybe 
enhance his profit. That means connection between power, responsibility 
and benefit. So runs the argument, but.. . 
Critique of the Decentralization Reform 
The reforms naturally have created a whole range of problems and have 
had more or less unforeseen consequences. A common critique of the con- 
tract responsibility system is that it does not fundamentally eradicate the 
vices of the old system. 
The regional contracting system is merely an improvement and a per- 
fection of the old system under new circumstances rather that the in- 
evitable outcome of deepening reform of the foreign trade system. 
Abandonment of the local regional form of contracting may be regarded 
as a more scientific choice for perfecting the foreign trade contracting 
business system and the deepening of foreign trade system reform. 
Thus reads an article in the influential reform-minded the World Economic 
Herald (which actually was closed down in April 1989 because of its sup- 
port to student demonstrations in Beijing) in December 1988. The article 
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proposes to discard the foreign trade regional contracting system and to in- 
stitute direct competitive contracting among enterprises. It is stated that 
the present system still lacks a competitive mechanism and therefore the 
defects of the old control methods have not been overcome, in fact they 
have rather been strengthened. A system of direct competition is called for, 
in which the state still issues contracts, but then calls for bids and has en- 
trepreneurs submit tenders. In this way a clear demarcation is introduced 
between the one issuing the contract and the contractor. Under the present 
system of regional contracting the interests of the two parties are almost 
identical, and the organizational structure of the old system is used as a 
compulsory measure for completing the state foreign trade plan. So the 
separation of ownership from operation is not completed. 
The call for competitive contracting touches the problem of who actually 
benefits from the decentralization to the lower administrative level. By not 
passing real power down to the level of producing enterprises - as would 
be the case if the enterprises had the opportunity to submit tenders - the 
old local bureaucrats are actually strengthened with the weakening of cen- 
tral control. The provincial authorities are the ones who chooses the con- 
tracting partner and the biggest part of the retained foreign exchange - be- 
sides the portion delivered to the state - also ends in the provincial 
treasury. This creates sound opportunities for different kinds of corrup- 
tion and by-gains as numerous examples have shown. The most famous 
being the socalled Hainan-scandal in 1984, where the whole of Hainan is- 
land, led by the local government, were engaged in illegal dealing with im- 
ported goods. As a special privilege Hainan was allowed to import goods 
duty-free and this right was used to import luxury goods like cars and 
coloured TV-sets with the aim of earning a big profit by selling them to 
other parts of China. 
Another argument against the reform is that the conflicts between ex- 
ports made and returns realized (that is the economic loss of export) have 
only been pushed down to lower levels. The national ))large pot(( has be- 
come a local ))medium-size pot,(( because the foreign trade enterprises 
never have been truly responsible for own profits and losses. If they do not 
fulfill their contracts, they are being subsidized by the state. They have 
traditionally been, and still are, treated as unprofitable enterprises, and 
they are in no way prepared to compete in the international market.' So 
the crux of the matter lies with the real economic responsibility of the en- 
terprises, which has not been enforced yet. To do justice to the reformers, it 
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need be added, that the contract responsibility system usually is not men- 
tioned as the ultimate goal, but as the method by which the enterprises 
gradually should become able to shoulder their own responsibilities. The 
question is whether the true responsibility for own profit and loss right 
away would not create so many bankruptcies in the foreign trade sector 
that the social and economic problems involved would be hard to tackle. 
The discarding of the monopoly of the FTCs in fact has created some kind 
of competition. The old FTCs were specialized in as many different groups 
of products as there were corporations, so no overlapping occurred. But as 
a result of the reform several corporations trade in the same product and 
fierce competition has occurred, creating severe losses in the state foreign 
exchange earnings. An export drive has also led to excessive export of 
products badly needed in China, so while sticking to the necessity of ex- 
port competition, the state now urges exporters to compete with the coun- 
try's general interests in mind. 
On the import side the problem lies in recklessness and impetuosity 
from the Chinese importers. The gap in technology and technique be- 
tween the imported equipment and the existing conditions is often too big 
to give a positive economic result. The Cherokee Jeep Manufacturing Plant 
in Beijing is often used as an example. The technology imported was 
mid-1980 standard, but the level of China's car industry is 30 og 40 years be- 
hind advanced world level. So still 57% of the parts have to be imported, 
because Chinese parts are either of poor quality or more expensive than 
imported parts. 
The agent system is not suited to the present conditions and very 
difficult to carry out, according to my own interviews in August 1989. The 
enterprises - many of them inexperienced in foreign trade are not able to 
judge the feasibilitybility of prices and other conditions, and they do not 
have the power to conduct all the formal procedures, so the old procure- 
ment system is still preferred. As one manager puts it: ))The state has only 
given us a new policy, they have not given us a new power.(( The question 
of foreign exchange is also a problem, because many enterprises lack a 
stock of foreign ecxhange to cover eventual losses, which frequently occur 
in export transactions because of the grossly overvalued RMB. Another 
factor might be that the foreign trade corporations actually earn less 
money by being agents than by trading themselves. So they may be reluc- 
tant to introduce the agent system by educating the enterprise managers; 
for instance, they have their own plan targets to fulfill, so why should they 
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invest in a system that gives them more work for the same income? 
Some enterprises, actually, are said to exert every effort to bypass the im- 
portlexport corporations, because they feel that the corporations are earn- 
ing foreign exchange at their expense. For instance, the prices by which 
their products are sold at the international market are kept secret, which 
might enhance some enterprise manager's feeling of being cheated. Some 
enterprises want to get the foreign exchange themselves to import equip- 
ment or consumer goods, so the right to trade directly, not even through 
agents, seems to be a coveted privilege among these enterprises, but very 
hard to obtain, One example: of 480 light industry enterprises in Harbin 
city only 7 had direct trading rights. 
Problems with foreign exchange 
As an overall assessment and analysis of the question of direct foreign in- 
vestment in China has been treated elsewhere9, it should not be repeated 
here. Instead a few concrete problems seen from the Chinese side will be 
touched upon. 
A big question for the foreign funded enterprises is the question of for- 
eign exchange, and the remittance of profits abroad. Article 75 of the 
))Regulations for the Implementation of the Joint Venture Lawc states: ))A 
joint venture shall in general keep a balance between its foreign exchange 
income and expenses.(( The reasons for this clause is obvious from the 
Chinese side: the joint ventures shall not be allowed to drain the state's 
precious foreign exchange reserves. But in practice it can be difficult within 
one enterprise to have such balance always and have foreign exchange for 
the lawful remittance of profits. In 1988 the proportion of total exports from 
foreign-funded enterprises to materials imported for processing was 
89,396. As a result, the foreign exchange balance issue has become a critical 
factor in foreigners' decision to invest in China. So different methods of cir- 
culating surplus foreign exchange between the enterprises have been 
tried. 
One method is to develop a regular market for foreign exchange. In 1985 
the first so-called )>Foreign Exchange Adjustment Center(( were opened in 
Shenzhen, and by early 1989 a total of 57 such centers in all were scheduled 
to be operating throughout China. Joint ventures are allowed to trade for- 
eign exchange at the centers; not all Chinese enterprises are, but the guide- 
lines have not been issued. In the beginning a ceiling existed on the allowa- 
Copenhagen Papers 5.90 - 156 
Recent Institutional Reforms in the Foreign Trade System of the People's Republic of China 
ble exchange rate, but it has now been abolished and the gap between the 
official exchange rate and the rate at the centers have risen to as much as 
70% at times. 
The provincial governments also have offered a similar kind of service 
since 1985. Enterprises can sell their foreign exchange credits to a govern- 
ment agency at the official rate. The agency then sells the foreign exchange 
at a much higher rate (close to that prevailing at the adjustment centers) to 
enterprises and projects in need of hard currency - and keeps the differ- 
ence. In view of the low rate of exchange, the seller may receive various 
forms of additional compensation from the government, such as extra allo- 
cation of raw materials. 
Other methods to resolve the enterprises' foreign exchange problems 
have been tried out: 1) To allow foreigners to reinvest their portion of RMB 
profits and enjoy preferential treatment. This is not always a solution to the 
problem, for the next project may end up with the same negative foreign 
exchange balance. 2) Provide full compensation. A foreign businessman 
can get compensation in RMB, with which he can procure domestically 
produced goods for export. This, however, only solves a limited number of 
foreign exchange balance problems since there are restrictions on pur- 
chases of unified managed products for exports by foreigners. And few 
non-unified managed goods can be provided due to low quality standard, 
limited quantity, etc. 3) Have foreign exchange secured loans in RMB. A 
joint venture may use idle foreign exchange as security for a RMB loan, 
which enables it to acquire needed RMB funds without converting any 
more foreign exchange. That is a way of saving foreign currency, to be used 
later in case of shortage. 4) Substitute products for imports. The joint ven- 
ture can apply for permission to substitute some of its own products for 
imports. In case of advanced technology or equipment such a permission 
is usually given, and that leaves the foreigner with his dollar in his hand. 
But still this method cannot solve all the cases.'' 
The joint venture may not only lack foreign exchange, but working capi- 
tal at large, and this problem has been treated in Sichuan, where 13 Sino- 
foreign joint ventures together with Foreign Exchange Affairs Bureau of 
the Commercial and Industrial Bank of China in May 1988 jointly set up 
the ((Sichuan Foreign Invested Enterprises Mutual Assistance Founda- 
tion.(( The foundation uses bank and enterprise funds. Funds may be allo- 
cated to enterprises upon application. The foundation stipulates that each 
member must deposit a minimum of 20.000 US dollars in the fund. The 
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bank involved provides that foundation members may borrow 8 RMB for 
each dollar deposited. So idle funds in one enterprise are able to work for 
another enterprise. 
Rising land prices in the zones 
Of the zones Hainan Island has the most liberal investment climate, f.ex. 
the province has the advantage of being allowed to transfer land use rights 
within a maximum term of 70 years (as against 50 in most of the other 
zones), and this right can be transferred, mortgaged, sold and inherited by 
parties other than the original owner. Within the next ten years, Hainan 
may keep all the economic benefits it can get out of the land without shar- 
ing with the state (other zones must deliver a percentage of the profit to the 
state). The aim of these privileges is, naturally, that Hainan should lower 
its price of land to attract investors and facilitate its own development. But 
on the contrary land prices are rising so fast, that they scare investors away, 
and the land market is chaotic. Prices between 5.000 and 10.000 Yuan pr. 
m2 have been mentioned followed by demand of personal, under-the-ta- 
ble cash rebate or other services. The provincial authorities have been urg- 
ing localities to lower the price of land, but they lack management rules 
and regulations to enforce price reductions. 
In Shenzhen the land prices are also on the rise. The record auction for 
land is now 4.700 Yuan per m2 and this seriously affects the investment en- 
vironment in the zone. Measures are now being worked out by the 
authorities to impose price limits on real estate in stages. The problem is an 
illustration of how political,economic measures, promulgated to facilitate 
a certain development, creates new, and maybe unforeseen, problems. 
The liberalization embodied in the permission to transfer land use rights 
has to be curtailed by the imposition of new regulations. 
Recent Trend: ))Recentralization<c 
Trends towards tighter control and some kind of centralization measures 
can be discerned for the nearest future, albeit MOFERT is formalizing the 
decentralization at the highest level by reorganizing and cutting its staff by 
22% from 1352 to 1055 employees. As of January 1,1989 all of the ministry's 
))bureauscc will be called ))departments,cc indicating the movement away 
from direct management to administrative functions. At the same time the 
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most important tasks for 1989 are formulated by MOFERT minister Zheng 
Tuobin as: ))the policy of controlling the economic climate and reorganiz- 
ing the economic order, control and reorganize the foreign trade climate 
and order and actively develop exports.cP As an answer to this the State 
Council in March 1989 issued a circular calling upon various regions and 
departments to check up on and rectify foreign economic operations and 
trade companies. Its main purpose is to ))solve the problems of govern- 
ment administration not being separated from enterprise functions, 
government affairs not being separated from commercial matter, illegal 
operations, business dislocations, and chaotic management.c(12 The circu- 
lar stresses the fact that the FTCs actually are relieved of their government 
administrative functions (except a small number which is directly autho- 
rized by the State Council), and orders that all foreign economic trade com- 
panies approved since January 1988 are to be reexamined and have to un- 
dergo a new approval procedure. 
A general impression in China at the moment is, in fact, that much effort 
is concentrated on screening and consolidating foreign trade enterprises 
and companies. Some are closed down, some are merged. 
Along the same lines managers of some important import and export 
corporations gathered by MOFERT in Beijing warn about serious 
problems in China's foreign trade in 1989. Major reasons mentioned are: 
- Sharp rises in purchasing prices of goods, for export, due to internal in- 
flation. 
- Shortage of foreign exchange. It is stated that many FTCs cannot afford 
to buy urgently needed raw material (and this was the situation before the 
nBeijing turmoil(( seriously aggravated China's foreign exchange prob- 
lems). 
- Lack of transportation facilities. 
- Disorder in the environment of foreign trade. That is, too many compa- 
nies engaged in import and export. 
The remedies proposed to ease the situation all imply state intervention: 
- State monopolization of important import goods. 
- State allocation of preferential loans to certain kinds of exporters. 
- State ordered priority to the transportation of raw materials used in the 
production of export goods in 1989.13 
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Concluding Remarks. 
Traditionally centralization in China has persisted through the ingrained 
channels uniting ownership rights and management rights, underlining 
the government's ultimate power right down to the level of production en- 
terprises. As other ways of controlling through legislation, indirect eco- 
nomic levers and the like ai.e still very new and weakly based in the 
Chinese bureaucracy, it is difficult to envisage how a control and consoli- 
dation drive can take place without harming the perceived, clearly formu- 
lated goal of separating the government and the enterprise functions. So 
maybe in two years time we again will hear complaints about the lack of 
economic vitality and enterpreneurship in the Chinese enterprises. 
The Tian An Men incident in June 1989 have also had a serious impact 
on China's foreign economic relations pushing in the same direction and 
aggravating the above-mentioned problems. The shortage of foreign ex- 
change and the bottle- necks in energy and transportation, which needed 
foreign investment to be solved, have all been worsened because of the 
Western world's prompt reaction to the shooting down of demonstrators in 
the center of Beijing at the 4th of June last year. The World Bank, US, and 
the EEC member states immediately cancelled all negotiations on new 
contracts and froze aid projects for more than 10 bio US dollars. Most seri- 
ously were probably the freezing of 7 World Bank loans at a total worth of 
780 mio US dollars earmarked for power and transport projects, and for in- 
dustrial development of Shanghai. The investors who already have a firm 
basis in China seems to be staying, but new one has been scared away by 
this sign of grave political instability. For instance the development of the 
Hainan SEZ, which was just in the making, seems to be almost halted. 
Also badly hit is the revenue from tourism. Tourists virtually stopped com- 
ing immediately after the June incident, and though the traffic slowly be- 
gan to accelerate during August and September the tourist income for the 
whole of 1989 is only 50% of the 1988 figure. 
The Chinese have firmly upheld the view that nothing is changed in the 
open door policy and they welcome foreigners as much as before, but the 
security authorities seem to have tightened communication between 
Chinese and foreigners, mostly in the realm of academic exchange, but 
there have also been restrictions on Chinese businessmen going abroad, 
probably more caused by the present economic austerity programme than 
by fear of poisonous Western influence. All in all, the Chinese economic 
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relations with the rest of the world must be said to have suffered greatly 
from last year's political disturbances. 
Hatla Thelle is a Research Associate at  the Center for East and Southeast Asian 
Studies, Universi ty  of Copenhagen. 
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